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RETHINKING CRIME LEGISLATION: 
HISTORY AND HARSHNESS 
V. F. Nourse* 
There is a truth about the criminal law that scholars evade as much as they 
criticize: the criminal law is produced by legislators (rather than the experts). 
Personally, I do not know of any way to make law in a democracy other than 
through the voters' representatives. And, yet, it is the standard pose of the 
criminal law scholar to denigrate legislatures and politicians as vindictive, 
hysterical, or stupid.1 All of these things may be true but name-calling is a poor 
substitute for analysis. As in constitutionallaw,2 so too in criminal law, it is time 
to put contempt aside and begin the process of understanding the history and the 
institutional dynamics of our nation's crime legislation. 
This is not a claim that the process is wise or rational; in fact, my present 
hunch is that the legislative process is subject to regular, cycling malfunction. My 
point is that we need to consider deeper questions-we need to ask whether 
legislative malfunctions are built into the political system. In other words, we 
need to turn to history, and specifically the history of crime legislation in the 
United States, to get a sense of its patterns over time. Here, I offer preliminary 
support for the claim that wars on crime-at least as political and legislative 
phenomena-are not new, nor post-World War II, phenomena as they are 
conventionally viewed.3 At a minimum, this evidence should prompt us to ask 
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin School of Law. 
1. For an example of such a critique, see e.g. William J. Chambliss, Power, Politics, and Crime ch. 1 
(Westview Press 1999). For the widespread existence of such a critique, see Lawrence M. Friedman, 
Some Remarks on Crime, Violence, History and Culture, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1121, 1134 (1998) ("Many 
people think our current policies are rather hysterical reactions."). The standard complaints by legal 
scholars about politics and the criminal law are hardly new, see, for example, Roscoe Pound, Criminal 
Justice in America 65-69 (Henry Holt & Co. 1930); indeed, they can be found in the ancient stalwart, 
Blackstone, who openly complained about the harshness of the bloody codification. William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. IV, **2-4 (U. Chi. Press 1979). 
2. Richard Parker has provided a devastating portrait of this contempt in constitutional law 
scholarship; much of the same argument could, and should, apply to criminal law scholarship. See 
Richard D. Parker, "Here the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist Manifesto (Harv. U. Press 1994). 
Although I make no claim to classify myself as a populist (something emerging as a "swear word" these 
days in criminological circles), I do believe that contemporary criminal law scholarship too often veers 
toward elitist self-congratulation. See e.g. Don Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders 
(Princeton U. Press 1998) (recognizing contempt as a form of hierarchical domination). 
3. See e.g. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal 
Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 829, 831 (2001) ("For some thirty years, American criminal law has 
waged a war on crime."). 
925 
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whether the crime problem in America is at least in part a reflection of the 
structure of American "crime politics."4 
How a nation deals out punishment reveals the character of its political and 
social life-and this is true whether the laws are efficacious or not, whether they 
respond to real problems or not. As Douglas Hay, the great historian, once wrote, 
even when "bloody" codes are evaded or remain unenforced, crime legislation 
supports the authority of an existing social and political order, the order that 
continues to control the political process and recapitulate itself through that 
process.5 In its recent Lawrence v. Texas6 decision, the Supreme Court came as 
close to recognizing this as the Supreme Court has ever come. Justice Kennedy 
noted that when the state backs its sanctions with violence, the powerful 
legitimatizing force of that opinion is likely to repeat itself within the social order,7 
justifying discrimination in private as well as public life. If this is right, then the 
criminal law works overtime: its meaning in our life cannot be reduced to a matter 
of arrests or sentences, it is reinforced even when there are few arrests and little 
violence, when bloody codes last long after the wars that inspired them. 
Analysis of the politics of crime legislation should have a far greater punch 
in criminal law scholarship if for no other reason than that criminal law's politics 
and legislation had such a real-life punch in the twentieth century. Wars on crime 
and their excesses appear to have left their legislative traces throughout the 
twentieth century. For example, crime legislation of the 1920s and 1930s has a 
remarkable set of analogues in the 1980s and 1990s,8 and that includes everything 
from three-strikes laws, mandatory minimum sentences, attacks on disparities in 
judicial sentencing, efforts to repeal the insanity defense, habitual sex offender 
laws, and the expansion of vagrancy laws to cover gangs-to name only some of 
the historical legislative efforts that have obvious modern legislative analogues.9 
4. To be sure, there are a bevy of scholars who see that the problem is related to politics, but very 
few have engaged in sustained attention to the dynamics and incentives of legislation or political 
institutions. One admirable, but too lonely, effort to address institutional incentives is Bill Stuntz's 
pathological politics piece. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 505 (2001). The standard critique of politics that often emerges from criminal law and 
criminological work is really a critical aesthetics (i.e., efforts to describe the state in global terms as 
penal-welfare, or penal-industrial, or neo-conservative etc.). I confess that I do not share the idea of 
politics on which such claims rest-that politics is best understood as a description of party platforms 
or a preferred set of end-state policies or outcomes, rather than a set of institutional structures and 
relations that intensify or inhibit particular substantive policies or cultural tendencies. See V.F. 
Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 835 (2004). 
5. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, 
John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson & Cal Winslow, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-
Century England 17 (Pantheon Bks. 1975). 
6. 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
7. 123 S. Ct. at 2482 ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the 
public and in the private spheres."). 
8. This claim certainly should not be read as one that these periods of history are alike; they are 
extraordinarily different. Indeed, it is their extraordinary difference that may account for why we have 
forgotten their legislative similarities. On the difficulties of the Depression in context, see infra notes 
46-56 and accompanying text. 
9. For a list of habitual offender laws operative during this period, see infra app. A. For 
mandatory minimum sentences, see e.g. 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 872, § 1; Baumes Act Upheld by Higher 
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Perhaps, as Jim Whitman has recently suggested, there is something rather 
persistent about the "harshness" of American criminallaw,10 something built into 
our political institutions or culture that accounts for this phenomenon, something 
that has very little to do with the conventional explanation that this is all about 
party politics, a new populism, neo-conservatism, or modernity. 11 
What, you ask, has this to do with George Fletcher? Whether or not he 
approves (and I have no idea whether he does), Fletcher is an inspiration in two 
senses. Rethinking Criminal Law12 ("Rethinking") refused to accept the scholarly 
conventions of the day. Fletcher traded in the narrow and hegemonic focus of the 
Model Penal Code for a rich comparative and historical project. However much I 
have disagreed with Professor Fletcher-and I have-it is not debatable that he is 
a scholar of great breadth, versed not only in the criminal law, but the law of the 
world and the history of the Constitution. This erudition and breadth has 
enriched his and our understanding of the criminal law. Indeed, it is precisely 
because Fletcher rejected the narrow confines of a discipline-that only seems to 
be getting narrower-that he began Rethinking with an injunction that remains 
Court: Supreme Court Says Life Sentence is Mandatory for a Fourth Offense, 76 N.Y. Times 3 (Dec. 2, 
1926); Want Crime Laws Made More Drastic: General Sessions Judges Urge Mandatory Life Term for 
Second Degree Murder, 76 N.Y. Times 11 (Oct. 15, 1926). For cycling claims about sentencing, see Jay 
S. Albanese, Concern About Variation in Criminal Sentences: A Cyclical History of Reform, 75 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 260 (1984). For a proposal for sentencing commissions to replace judicial 
sentencing, see C. G. Poore, Revolutionary Plan for Handling Criminals: Governor Smith's Proposal to 
Leave the Sentencing of Convicted Felons to a State Board Is Endorsed by Prison Authorities as a 
Needed Reform, 77 N.Y. Times 7 (Dec. 18, 1927). For a legislative attack on the insanity defense, see 
Sinclair v. State, 132 S. 581 (Miss. 1931). For the attempted expansion of vagrancy ordinances in the 
1930s to cover "gangs" of racketeers, then called "public enemy" laws, see John J. Sullivan, The Public 
Enemy Act of New York, 5 Brook. L. Rev. 62 (1935-36); the recent analogue is the kind of statute 
debated in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). For sexual psychopath laws, both pre-WWII 
and more modern, see Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1317 (1998) (relying in part on Estelle B. Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the 
Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960,74 J. Am. Hist. 83 (1987)). 
There are also parallels in social movements, such as the censorship campaigns of the early 
1930s, which were based, as were similar campaigns in the 1980s, on claims that "culture" was to blame 
for crime. As in most things historical, there are also contrary influences. There were movements in 
state governments, for example, to make parole and probation real rather than illusory (because of 
lack of funds or personnel); there was also a strong movement to have psychiatric clinics used by judges 
and a significant elite movement against the death penalty. Perhaps upon further investigation, I shall 
find greater disparity. At present, however, I find the legislative analogues rather remarkable, even if 
they tell an incomplete story. 
10. James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between 
America and Europe (Oxford U. Press 2003). 
11. David Garland's fine book, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary 
Society (U. Chi. Press 2001), emphasizes the role of modernity and populism in creating a culture of 
"control." Malcolm Feeley, in his review of Garland, focuses on the neo-conservative strain of modern 
politics. Malcolm M. Feeley, Crime, Social Order and the Rise of Neo-Conservative Politics, 7 
Theoretical Criminology 111-30 (2003). In part, I think this is explained by the focus of these inquiries, 
which is typically on the gap between politics and "expert" opinion, rather than legislation or the 
legislative process itself. It certainly is true that, from a criminal justice "professional's" point of view, 
the political world appears to have radically changed starting in 1970. The question remains whether 
this focus-on the experts view-is the right one; and, more importantly, whether 1970 should be 
considered the proper baseline for historical comparison. 
12. George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1978). 
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unheeded by the academy: the criminal law is not only a matter of statistics or 
doctrine, but it also raises important questions of political theory.13 
Political theory should not, however, be a work of the abstract. Theory must 
explain practice. Elsewhere, I have begun the project of "rethinking" criminal law 
as it reflects the history of political theory.14 Here I offer a brief and preliminary 
take on another facet of this problem-the history of crime legislation. Because 
of the ongoing nature of my project, all that I say here is truly provisional and 
awaits a much lengthier defense. But in anticipation of that project, I offer the 
preliminary results of a study of American crime politics in the twentieth century, 
focused on one of the more prominent symbols of antipathy toward "wars on 
crime," the "three-strikes" law. Three-strikes laws may be bad memories but they 
are memories. 15 I recount this history as description, not prescription. Instead, I 
suggest that were we to take seriously the possibility of such patterns, we might 
turn our attention to different kinds of solutions to standard criminal law debates. 
CRIME POLITICS IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 
Scholars and popular pundits alike have perpetuated what may be a myth of 
crime politics in the twentieth century: that it begins with Reagan or Bush or 
perhaps Nixon and amounts to a fairly recent conspiracy.16 Many are aware of the 
Federal government's involvement in prohibition, but few remember that the 
great liberal President, Franklin Roosevelt, waged a "war" on crime17 (borrowing 
the war metaphor/8 like much else, from Herbert Hoover).19 Almost every 
13. /d. at xix ("Criminal law is a species of political and moral philosophy. Its central question is 
justifying the use of the state's coercive power against free and autonomous persons."). Fletcher's own 
work has, of course, focused mostly, but not exclusively, on the moral philosophy part of this equation. 
14. See e.g. V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1691 (2003). 
15. The conventional wisdom among scholars is that three-strikes laws are a fairly recent political 
phenomenon. See e.g. Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins & Sam Kamin, Punishment and 
Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California 4 (Oxford U. Press 2001) (stating that three-
time loser laws existed prior to the late twentieth century but were not "an important issue in the 
modern politics of law and order until the 1990s."). I confess that I, too, subscribed to the conventional 
wisdom until I was forced to confront this history for purposes of another project. My critique should 
be understood, then, with a sense of humility and in the spirit of intellectual discovery. 
16. See e.g. Chambliss, supra n. 1, at 24 (suggesting that "tough on crime" began in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s), 27 ("Crime has been raised to the level of a national crisis by a coalition of 
interests . . . including (1) conservative politicians concerned primarily with repressing civil rights 
activism and political dissent."). 
17. It was Roosevelt whose men, at least, were to regularly invoke the metaphor. See e.g. infra n. 
19. The historical literature on this war is sparse. See Kenneth O'Reilly, A New Deal for the FBI: The 
Roosevelt Administration, Crime Control, and National Security, 69 J. Am. Hist. 638 (1982) (O'Reilly 
notes that standard treatments of the New Deal generally limit their treatment of the "crime war" to a 
few paragraphs). Claire Bond Potter's work tends to focus, as does O'Reilly, on J. Edgar Hoover's 
shenanigans, rather than on the history of crime politics and legislation of the period. See Claire Bond 
Potter, War on Crime: Bandits, G-Men, and the Politics of Mass Culture (Rutgers U. Press 1998). 
18. As in many things, Roosevelt inherited the battleground metaphor from his more maligned 
predecessor, Herbert Hoover. By 1930, Hoover was insisting on a war against "gangsters," but his 
"war" was largely rhetorical since he insisted that there was no federal power to intervene. See 
President Demands War on Gangsters; Puts Duty on States: Calls for 'Awakening to Failure of Some 
Local Governments to Protect Their Citizens,' 80 N.Y. Times 1 (Nov. 26, 1930). The war metaphor 
appears to have percolated up into federal politics from the states. See e.g. A "Private War" on Crime: 
Chicago's Battalions at Work, 80 N.Y. Times XX3 (Sept. 20, 1931); W.A. Warn, Gov. Roosevelt Asks 
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president since has waged war on crime, whether a small one (as Eisenhower's 
battle against juvenile delinquency) or a fierce one (like Kennedy's battle against 
organized crime), one primarily focused on predators (as Reagan's), or one 
disastrously focused on political enemies (as Nixon's). Clinton had a war and so 
did Bush the elder. Indeed, there seems hardly a period in the twentieth 
century-other than during an actual war-that the United States was not 
• • • 20 
warnng agamst cnme. 
Firmer Laws to Aid Police War on Crime: Message Calls on Legislatures to Act Promptly on 
Gangdom's Challenge to Society, 80 N.Y. Times 1 (Sept. 2, 1931) (the reference is to Franklin 
Roosevelt as Governor of New York at the time); Public Aid Asked in War on Crime: National 
Commission's Committee Meets at Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 75 N.Y. Times 23 (Nov. 20, 1925). 
At the turn of the century, it was far more common for newspapers to speak of "crime waves" than 
wars on crime, and this may well reflect intervening events, i.e., the First World War, which created a 
consciousness of the way in which the public could be motivated during war. Indeed, the war 
metaphor was widely used by Roosevelt's brain trust as a way to galvanize public opinion. 
19. Joseph M. Proskauer, How Shall We Deal with Crime, 159 Harper's Mthly. Mag. 419,419 (Sept. 
1929) ("The President of the United States recently voiced the general belief that in our country's 'life 
and property are relatively more unsafe than in any other civilized country in the world,' and an 
equally general demand that a cure be found for this condition."); Roosevelt Asks Narcotic War Aid: 
States Are Urged to Adopt Uniform Laws, Modeled on Harrison Act, 84 N.Y. Times 7 (Mar. 22, 1935); 
A New Day in America for Justice and for the Law, Daily Oklahoman 8 (July 30, 1934) ("When the 
history of the Roosevelt administration has been written, not the least significant, in fact, one of the 
greatest of its achievements will have been the tremendous headway made against major crime by 
Attorney General Cummings and his department of justice."); R. S. Thornburgh, The War on Crime: 
The Justice Department Has Extended Its Activities, 83 N.Y. Times XX6 (Mar. 4, 1934); Senate Body 
Strengthens Crime Laws, Enforcement: Senator Copeland Tells President of New Proposals, Wash. Post 
1 (Dec. 17, 1933); Joseph B. Keenan, Uncle Sam Presses His New War on Crime: Joseph B. Keenan, 
Who Heads the Government's Nation-Wide Drive against Racketeers and Kidnappers Tells of the 
Federal Aims, the Need for New Laws, and the Forming of a Sound Plan for Widening the Campaign to 
Relieve Gang-Ridden Communities, 82 N.Y. Times 1 (Aug. 20, 1933). None of this should be 
misconstrued as an attempt to paint Roosevelt as unsympathetic to more liberal positions on penal 
reform. See e.g. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Prison and Parole Problems (N.Y.C., Jan. 18, 
1930), in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt vol. 1, 376, 377 (Random House 
1938) ("We at last understand that not philanthropy but mere common sense, and our own self-
protection require that these men [prisoners] should be released, chastened and reformed if possible, 
but at least not rendered more vicious, more degraded, than when they were sentenced."). 
20. To say that the rhetoric is the same is not to say that the policy is; nor am I making that claim. 
Not all wars on crime are alike: some hit wide sections of the criminal code; others are quite narrowly 
focused on enforcement. Some Presidents seem to relish war, and others accept it as a necessary evil. 
And yet the persistence of the rhetoric suggests that any explanation of legislative harshness must 
reach across party lines. On Clinton's war, see Chambliss, supra n. 1; on the George H.W. Bush war, 
see Andrew Rosenthal, Taking Message on Road, Bush Pushes Crime Bill, 139 N.Y. Times A20 (Jan. 
24, 1990); on Reagan's war, see Stuart Taylor Jr., New Attack on Crime: Reagan's Proposals Viewed as 
More Likely to Appease Citizens Than Reduce Offenses, 131 N.Y. Times A28 (Sept. 30, 1981); Lee 
Lescaze, Reagan Blames Crime on 'Human Predator,' Wash. Post A2 (Sept. 29, 1981); on Carter's war, 
see Wayne King, Bell to Step Up War on Crime in Sunbelt: Attorney General Plans to Reopen Federal 
Office in New Orleans to Curb Syndicate in South, 127 N.Y. Times 9 (Oct. 15, 1977); on Ford's war, see 
James M. Naughton, President in Miami Pledges a 'Crusade' On Crime in Nation, 125 N.Y. Times 81 
(Sept. 28, 1976); John M. Crewdson, President Urges Stiff New Laws on Violent Crime, 124 N.Y. Times 
1 (June 20, 1975); on Nixon's war, see R. W. Apple Jr., Mitchell Says Congress Foils Nixon's Crime 
War, 119 N.Y. Times 1 (Dec. 14, 1969); on Johnson's war, see John P. MacKenzie, President Outlines 
Proposals to Fight Nationwide Crime, Wash. Post A6 (Mar. 10, 1966); Transcript of Johnson's Statement 
on Signing Crime and Safety Bill, 117 N.Y. Times 23 (June 20, 1968); on Kennedy's war, see Robert 
Kennedy Says U.S. Drive on Crime Is Curbing Hoodlums, 111 N.Y. Times 19 (Jan. 2, 1962); Alvin 
Shuster, Kennedy Offers Plan to Combat Juvenile Crimes, 110 N.Y. Times 1 (May 12, 1961); Kennedy 
Asks More for Drive on Crime, 110 N.Y. Times 24 (Mar. 7, 1961); on Eisenhower's war, see $3,000,000 
Sought in War on Crime: President Acts to Aid States Curb Delinquency-Budget Also Helps the Aged, 
104 N.Y. Times 22 (Jan. 18, 1955). 
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One might dismiss this as mere symbolism or rhetorical excess if it weren't a 
reflection of some legislative realities. To see this, let us look closely at the history 
of legislation often used to symbolize modern "tough-on-crime" politics-three 
strikes laws.21 It turns out that long before the Reagan-Bush era, there were 
political movements advocating three-strikes laws.22 Indeed, it is fair to say that 
three-strikes laws-then called habitual offender laws-swept the nation in the 
period from the mid-1920s until the mid-1930s. These laws were so popular that 
manuals on them were created for debating societies?3 One of the reasons that 
these laws have gone unnoticed is because they went by a particular name, after 
their "inventor," a New York legislator named Caleb Baumes.24 To be sure, not 
all legislatures adopted Baumes's mandatory-life solution, and some laws were 
harsher than others, but this is a difference in degree, not kind. The conclusion 
remains the same: contrary to widespread scholarly assumption, today's three-
strikes laws are not unprecedented. Between 1920 and 1945, laws mandating or 
permitting life imprisonment for repeat felonies (two, three, or four prior 
offenses) were passed or operative in more than twenty states.25 
The politics of this first twentieth-century generation of three-strikes laws 
was similar to that of later incarnations. Consider an account taken from the 1927 
report of the New York State Crime Commission, which in standard self-
congratulatory tone described these laws as novel and extraordinarily effective. 
The laws were dubbed a "legislative thunderbolt."26 They had been so effective, 
recounted one criminologist, that murders resulting from robberies were down by 
over half and many criminals had simply "left ... for other states."27 Given claims 
that these laws resulted in the immediate reduction of crime,28 it was not surprising 
that other states soon followed suit, either amending existing laws or enacting new 
ones to provide for life imprisonment upon a third or fourth felony?9 
21. My present study is limited to the twentieth century, although life imprisonment for repeaters is 
much older. See e.g. 1822 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176, § 5 (where a person is again convicted of a crime 
punishable by hard labor, in addition to the penalty for the crime, he shall have 30 days solitary 
confinement and seven years added to penalty; for the third offense, he shall have the same term of 
solitary confinement, and shall be imprisoned for life). Moreover, that second felony increases were 
prevalent at the beginning of the century is testified to by a series of cases in which the constitutionality 
of such laws was tested before the First World War. See e.g. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 
(1912); State v. Findling, 144 N.W. 142 (Minn. 1913); State v. Le Pitre, 103 P. 27 (Wash. 1909). 
22. Note that this is a descriptive claim, not a prescriptive one; I am not advocating these laws. 
23. The Baumes Laws 89 (Ref. Shelf Vol. 6, Series No.3, Julia E. Johnsen compiler, H.W. Wilson 
Co. 1929) (presenting "both sides" of the debates of contemporary controversy). 
24. 1926 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 457, § 2, 805. 
25. Infra app. A (a list of sentencing laws for habitual offenders). A federal habitual offender law 
was also enacted in 1929: the Jones-Stalker Act. 27 U.S.C. § 91 (repealed 1935); see The Jones-Stalker 
Act, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 120 (1930). 
26. Clayton Ettinger, The Problem of Crime 303 (Ray Long & Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1932). 
27. /d. Should the reference to leaving for other states seem odd, it is important to remember that, 
in that day and age, governors still issued "banishment paroles." Such a practice testifies to the ways in 
which life and crime were once perceived as far more local than they are today. 
28. The Baumes Laws, supra n. 23, at 114; Ettinger, supra n. 26, at 303. 
29. See State v. Close, 287 P. 599 (Kan. 1930): 
Our Legislature evidently had the above act [the Baumes law] before it. While it saw fit to 
change the language and to enact a more severe law by providing life imprisonment for a 
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These laws created their share of controversy, inciting disagreement not only 
among lawyers and judges, but in the public as well.30 Just as we see with 
mandatory sentencing guidelines today, judges who were forced to apply the 
Baumes laws were sometimes resistant. Also as we see today, unjust applications 
of these laws yielded public uproar and demands, in some cases, to limit the law's 
applications, as in cases where grandmothers could find themselves sentenced to 
jail for life for fairly trivial offenses.31 As they do today, commentators rightly 
asked why legislatures were passing such laws given the existence of already harsh 
penalties.32 So, too, the experts doubted whether there was a real increase in 
crime.33 And it was only upon crisis-serious overcrowding and riots in New York 
prisons-that the Baumes laws themselves were softened to a mandatory 
minimum penalty.34 
Also not surprising was the way legislative sponsors turned the expertise of 
the day in their favor, selectively applying criminology to support their political 
claims. Representative Baumes, for example, explained that his laws were simply 
"carrying into effect what criminologists, social workers, [and others] ... have 
been urging for some years, namely, that our laws and our punishments should be 
third conviction of felony, instead of a fourth conviction, as the New York law does, yet it 
had in mind the same purpose and object as the New York Legislature, namely to provide 
additional penalties for the commission of felonies subsequent to the first one, and thereby 
strive to deter the criminally inclined from committing repeated felonies. 
/d. at 602. See also T.V., Student Author, Habitual-Criminal Statutes and the Proposed 
Pennsylvania Act, 77 Pa. L. Rev. 798, 801 (1928-1929) (noting that the proposed 
Pennsylvania version was discretionary but was "based on certain sections of the New York 
Penal Law, popularly known as the 'Baumes Law,' which has been the model for a number 
of habitual-criminal statutes that have been adopted very recently in some of the states." 
(emphasis omitted)). 
30. See e.g. P.M., Student Author, Attempts to Combat the Habitual Criminal, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 565, 
566 (1931-1932) ("When first put into effect in New York, there was considerable opposition to the law 
on the part of the lower courts."); Minimum Jail Term Opposed by Judges: Plan to Fix One- Year 
Sentence for First Offenders Called "Absurd and Illogical," 81 N.Y. Times 8 (Jan. 16, 1932); First-
Offender Law Declared 'Inhuman': Lewisohn Commission Reports That Severity of Indeterminate 
Terms Defeats Purpose, 81 N.Y. Times 5 (Feb. 15, 1932). The law review commentary was also 
generally negative. See e.g. J.A. Royce McCuaig, Modern Tendencies in Habitual Criminal Legislation, 
15 Cornell L.Q. 62 (1930). 
31. See e.g. Woman, 85, Escapes Life Term as Thief" State Permits Mrs. La Touche to Plead Guilty to 
Minor Charge Because of Her Age, 80 N.Y. Times 17 (Sept. 1, 1931). 
32. As one commentator asked, if increased punishment for second crimes has been "in constant 
application" since the early nineteenth century, "(i]t would seem strange ... if the application of so old 
a principle were going to solve the present problem when it had not already done so." See P.M., supra 
n. 30, at 566. 
33. See e.g. Experts Discover No 'Wave' of Crime: Hoover Research Group Finds No Gain Since 
1925 in Minor and Many Major Categories, 82 N.Y. Times 17 (Feb. 27, 1933). Such expert skepticism 
had been raised for some time. See e.g. The 'Crime Wave' and Public Hysteria, L. Notes 205 (Feb. 
1922). It is worth noting at this point that the political science literature would predict that social 
science expertise would be used opportunistically-that politicians pick and choose their experts to fit 
their positions and that, in any event, those opinions will be molded to the felt political demands of the 
times. In such a world "real" crime rates different from those used by crime "warriors" will only have 
meaning if there is a real and meaningful political opposition to take them up. 
34. Governor Roosevelt can be credited with this movement, although the result was that life 
imprisonment was made discretionary and a minimum mandatory penalty appears to have been added. 
See Two Views of Parole, 82 N.Y. Times 22 (Apr. 7, 1932); W.A. Warn, Gov. Roosevelt Asks Firmer 
Laws to Aid Police War on Crime, 81 N.Y. Times 1 (Sept. 2, 1931). 
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made to suit the criminal, not the crime."35 Baumes insisted that the law was 
• 36 
compassiOnate: 
They say that you should treat this man, that he is a sick man .... Now I say, by 
the very same token, we should take care of this man though he is sick. . . . I would 
be entirely satisfied if they will take this class of men and put them in an institution 
and call it a protective detention institution, and keep them there for your 
protection and mine and the protection of your family and mine.37 
Contrast this political and legislative story with the story that is typically told 
by academics about the criminal law of the 1920s and 1930s. Most academics 
remember it as the era when Sheldon Glueck won out over Joseph Beale, an era 
of realism and the injection of social science into the legal curriculum, when 
criminal law professors were happily recruited from the ranks of criminologists 
and psychiatrists.38 This was the era in which Dean Pound excoriated the academy 
for failing to study and reform the criminal law and in particular criminal 
procedure.39 This was the era of the great "studies" and "crime commissions." 
Most criminal law scholars have heard of the Wickersham Commission and its 
fourteen volumes.4° Few will recall that even before Wickersham there were 
volumes issued in the states and President Coolidge's National Crime 
Commission.41 The recommendations of these commissions were all quite 
forward-looking, often focusing on streamlining criminal procedure, opposing the 
35. The Baumes Laws, supra n. 23, at 89. 
36. !d. at 99 ("The theory of the Fourth Offender Act is not punishment at all, but it is protection to 
the public."). 
37. /d. at 104 (quoting Caleb B. Baumes, Chairman of the New York State Crime Commission in 
the 1920s). Baumes was correct in stating that during this period some criminologists, following 
insistently the theory that the focus should be on the criminal rather than the crime, advocated 
preventive detention. 
38. Professor Beale, author of one of the leading criminal law casebooks of the day, was the butt of 
many of the realists' charges. They called it Bealism. In 1930, Sheldon Glueck was one of the most 
famous criminal law professors in the country; his social scientific studies of large samples of offenders 
seemed, at the time, to open the way for finding the key to rehabilitation. See Sheldon Glueck & 
Eleanor T. Glueck, One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents: Their Treatment by Court and Clinic (Harv. 
U. Press 1939). 
39. Pound, supra n. 1, at 210-11 (1930) ("Unfortunately the backwardness of juristic science with 
respect to criminal justice is of long standing. . . . Nowhere is the need of the highest type of juristic 
writing so acute as in the criminal law. Nowhere does there seem so little prospect of it."). 
40. Natl. Commn. L. Observance & Enforcement, Report on Criminal Procedure (Series No. 8, U.S. 
Govt. Printing Off. 1931); Natl. Commn. L. Observance & Enforcement, Report on Crime and the 
Foreign Born (Series No. 10, U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1931); Natl. Commn. L. Observance & 
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (Series No. 11, U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 
1931). 
41. The crime commission movement in the states predated Wickersham by some years. See Esther 
Conner, Crime Commission and Criminal Procedure in the United States since 1920: A Bibliography, 21 
Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 129 (1930-31). The New York Commission yielding the Baumes law 
was seen as a model by some. See e.g. Wants All States to Seek Crime Data: Richard W. Child Cites 
New York Commission's Work to Show Its Aid to Legislation, 76 N.Y. Times 40 (Mar. 14, 1927). The 
various state and local studies are listed in Conner; the prior Cleveland study is probably the best 
known to legal scholars because it was edited by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter. Cleveland 
Foundation, Criminal Justice in Cleveland: Reports of the Administration of Criminal Justice in 
Cleveland, Ohio (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., Patterson Smith 1922). 
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"third-degree," and impaling crass public assumptions such as the idea, then quite 
prevalent, that the "foreign-born" were responsible for crime.42 
To remember this story is to focus on intellectual history (indeed, the 
intellectual history that tends to include academics). For the people of the 1920s 
and 1930s, crime was a part of real life,43 as real as machine gun shootings, 
motorcars, and children being gunned down in the streets. This fear was in part a 
panic-fear of crime always is. But in this, there is less that is different about 
crime and crime legislation than is conventionally thought. Laws are frequently 
passed because of panic or even sheer anecdote-because of a flood or a 
hurricane, because of the impending close of government, or because of a terrorist 
bombing. This exaggerates, but only a bit, particularly if one remembers how 
extraordinarily difficult it is to pass any piece of legislation, how easy it is to block 
legislation (a single vote may be enough), and how fear is a powerful galvanizing 
factor in many political matters-including matters of civil rights, global warming, 
cold wars, and even the United Nations.44 
In the early 1930s, there were some reasons to panic, and they were more 
than the public celebrities we remember or the film nair they inspired. At the 
height of the Depression scare, two-and-a-half-year-old Dorette Zeitlow was 
"snatched" by a thirteen year old and left to die in an icehouse outside Chicago. 
Ten thousand mobbed her funeral. 45 In April 1934, five thousand men searched 
the Arizona desert for the body of six-year-old June Robles, who had been 
kidnapped and buried alive in a box (she survived).46 In May, in Toledo, the 
National Guard battled six thousand striking workers, and in Oklahoma City, 
twelve hundred men and women stormed the relief offices.47 Six months earlier, 
in San Jose, California, a mob lynched two white kidnappers, and the Governor 
pardoned them on the spot, thanking them for their vengeance.48 Is it a surprise in 
this world that federalism objections to national intervention (which were made) 
42. See e.g. Report on Criminal Procedure, supra n. 40; Report on Crime and the Foreign Born, supra 
n. 40; Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, supra n. 40. 
43. Editorial, A Change Toward Criminals, Muskogee Daily Phoenix 18 (May 4, 1934) ("Time was 
when a murder in another locality did not strike home."). 
44. These facts are a staple not only of legislative studies but also of the law of legislation. See 
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial 
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1447, 1476 (1995). 
45. Throngs Riot, Fight to See Bier of Baby: Morbid Mob Tears Up Wreaths at Funeral of Chicago 
Child, Daily Oklahoman 1 (Apr. 14, 1934). 
46. 1,000 Armed Men in Vengeful Hunt for Kidnapped Girl: Canyons, Desert Scanned as Second 
Note Proves to Be Spurious, Tulsa Daily World 1 (Apr. 27, 1934). 
47. Nine Arrested as 1,200 Rush Relief Bureau: Tear Gas Bombs Break Up Crowd Converging upon 
Commissary, Daily Oklahoman 1 (May 22, 1934); Savage Strike Riot Flares Anew, Muskogee Daily 
Pheonix 1 (May 5, 1934). 
48. Gov. Rolph Backs San Jose Lynching As Kidnap Warning: He Will Pardon Any Arrested-
Favors Turning Over to Mob Convicted Abductors, 83 N.Y. Times 1 (Nov. 28, 1933); "A Fine Lesson," 
83 N.Y. Times 20 (Nov. 28, 1933); Rolph Statement Stirs Storm Here: Civil Liberties Union Wires Stand 
Makes Him a Party to Lynching, 83 N.Y. Times 3 (Nov. 28, 1933). 
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were given short shrift, and that Congress in May of 1934 put its final stamp of 
approval on expansive new federal criminal laws in two hours on a Saturday?49 
My point in recounting this is not to embrace the stories of victims-nor to 
glorify "tough on crime"-but to suggest that there is more to the meaning of the 
criminal law than some imagine. In politics, the criminal law is always about order 
on a larger scale; it is about the nature of government itself Although I think this 
generally true, it is quite evident in the period in which many of these laws arose. 
Remember, this was the Depression, a world where many were literally eating out 
of garbage cans and a quarter of the nation was out of work.50 Many citizens 
during the early 1930s believed democracy was dead. By 1935, radical popular 
movements, led by Huey Long and Father Coughlin, seemingly bent on 
"revolution," had rounded up millions of supporters.51 In such a world, crime 
symbolized grave disorder and even political collapse. 
If crime legislation is about order, it is because crime carries the risk of 
rebellion. As Eric Hobsbawm showed us, the public may well understand the 
bandit as a rebel,52 and if there was an American age of the criminal as a bandit, 
the thirties was it, with its Bonnies and Clydes, Machine Gun Kellys and 
Dillingers. Perhaps then it really should be no surprise to learn that when 
Franklin Roosevelt heard that movie audiences were cheering public enemies, he 
reminded the country that they were in fact at war on crime.53 He and other 
Presidents of this century have understood that crime legislation is a powerful 
symbol of public and political order and stability. Roosevelt may not have had 
any enthusiasm for his crime war (it appears to have been marshaled by his 
attorney general, Homer Cummings,54 who also helped to push the terrible idea to 
pack the Supreme Court55), but Roosevelt had enough enthusiasm to campaign on 
the idea of "security," linking social security to the war on crime. 56 
49. Dillinger Causes House to Pass 10 Anti-Crime Bills: Sweeping Power Voted to Federal Agents, 
with Roosevelt Applying the Goad, Muskogee Daily Phoenix 1 (May 6, 1934). The "two hours on a 
Saturday" is journalistic (indeed, it is taken from newspaper accounts at the time). Although reporters 
like to make much of speed in these matters, this was a two-hour debate on a conference committee 
report; crime measures along these lines had been debated for some time by the spring of 1934. 
50. See e.g. 78 Cong. Rec. 449 (1934) (comment by Sen. Royal S. Ferguson) ("There are places in 
America where orderly government has disappeared, where the underworld is in control. I do not wish 
to indulge in any extravagant statement, but I am here to say that unless America shall be aroused the 
underworld gangster will come more and more into control in the United States."). 
51. Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression 6-7 
(Vintage Bks. 1983) (quoting General HughS. Johnson). 
52. Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New Press 2000). 
53. See e.g. New Dillinger Killings Stir the President and He Asks Quick Action on Crime Bills, 83 
N.Y. Times 1 (Apr. 24, 1934); Roosevelt Opens Attack on Crime, Signing Six Bills as 'Challenge': 
Extending Federal Jurisdiction to Interstate Gang Offenses, with Death for Some Kidnappers, He Calls 
on People to Join in War on Underworld, 83 N.Y. Times 1 (May 19, 1934). 
54. See Crime War 'Real' Asserts Cummings, 83 N.Y. Times 3 (Sept. 12, 1933); Wide Power Asked in 
Drive on Crime, 84 N.Y. Times 11 (Feb. 20, 1934); Federal 'Teeth' Asked in Gang War, 84 N.Y. Times 
46 (Mar. 20, 1934). 
55. See Marian C. McKenna, Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional War: The Court-
Packing Crisis of 1937 (Fordham U. Press 2002) (recounting Homer S. Cumming's involvement in the 
court-packing plan based on newly discovered evidence). 
56. See e.g. President Offers Kansans Security as New Deal Fact: School Expenditures the Last Place 
to Economize, He Tells 20,000 in Kansas City, 86 N.Y. Times 1, 16 (Oct. 14, 1936) (stating that 
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My point is not to make Roosevelt a crime-warrior; rather, it is to insist upon 
considering the idea that the crime legislation of the twentieth century-the real 
politics-has been remarkably predictable. And that it has been predictable 
because of an obvious structural problem: no one is "for" crime and thus the 
political debate remains invariably one-sided.57 Criminal law scholars must 
consider the possibility that there is nothing recent about the harshness of 
American crime politics or legislation, that the politics of crime that academics 
abhor is not a temporary phenomenon, nor one limited to a particular political 
party, nor one that follows fashions against the "welfare" state.58 Perhaps it is 
built into American political culture, as Whitman's cross-cultural comparison 
suggests.59 Or, as I have a hunch, our political culture of crime-no doubt 
imagined in the form of rugged individualism and manliness-is exacerbated and 
amplified by the very political structure we otherwise cherish. 
There is every reason to believe that American crime politics is likely to be 
different from crime politics in other countries, and that is because our system of 
government has no precise analogue anywhere in the world. Its system of 
federalized control coupled with the separation of powers (its presidential, non-
parliamentary system) makes politics a highly redundant, but also highly 
competitive, affair. It means that, typically, our government is perpetually 
ineffectual-that it is very hard to get agreement on any particular policy, much 
harder than in parliamentary systems where political parties hold more sway, and 
can effectively control, rather than compete, with the administration. It also 
means that crisis legislation, in all matters, is likely to have greater importance as a 
way to push toward agreement. (What, after all, is the war metaphor but a means 
to galvanize public opinion, to suggest the need for action and sacrifice?) 
All of this is made even harder by the fact that there are two competing 
governments, each with its separate powers, and here I refer to the existence of 
the states. States must compete with the nation for voters' attention and 
allegiance. In the nineteenth century, crime was largely a local and state affair. 
With the institution of mass communication-which allowed fear of crime to 
spread across the nation almost instantaneously-the stage was set for federal 
intervention on a substantial scale, something that began at the turn of the century 
and became politically irresistible in the wake of the kidnapping scare of the early 
1930s. This structural shift-which is unique to the twentieth century-increased 
political competition. And increased competition in a world of one-sided-or 
"security" was the theme of the campaign in Kansas and "[u]nder the heading of 'security' he grouped 
not only old-age pensions and unemployment insurance but the Federal war on crime."). 
57. This suggests that the real question to ask may be not "why harshness?," but "why mildness?" 
My suspicion is that religion played an important role in restraining American crime policy in the 
nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, as I indicated, when fears of government itself were 
stronger than fears of one's citizens (as exemplified in the Watergate/Vietnam era), then there may 
have been more political will to restrain government actors. 
58. If this is right, and admittedly my research remains provisional, then one must consider all sorts 
of seemingly contrarian propositions. For example, wars on crime may turn out to be as consistent 
with welfare-state-building as welfare-state-opposition. 
59. Whitman, supra n. 10. 
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perhaps more accurately, no-debate (criminals, remember, cannot vote) is likely 
to yield increasingly extreme legislation. Only when the fear turns inward, when 
people are more afraid of the police than they are of their fellow citizens' use of 
violence, is the harshness countered. Then the politics changes abruptly, in 
punctuated fashion, and only temporarily (as in the 1960s and 1970s).60 My hunch, 
then, is that criminal law harshness is the norm, not the exception, of twentieth-
century American crime politics.61 
To recognize this is not, in my view, to embrace despair, and certainly not to 
justify a return to "original" solutions. Simply because a few states in 1930s still 
whipped their prisoners, and one even tried to use them as mules, does not mean 
that we should return to such a tradition. It is to say that, if one is looking for real 
solutions, rather than self-congratulation, one will have to look in the very places 
that criminal law scholars fear to tread-inside politics and political institutions. 
There are obvious candidates for consideration. For example, scholars might 
consider the problem of specific legislative malfunctions and informational 
failures. They might turn their attention to the predictable information failures 
that occur when legislative bodies attempt to ensnare the big fish and instead 
catch the small fry. For it seems clear, both from the debates and the results, that 
legislators pay little attention to what every first year law student knows about the 
ancillary liabilities of aiding and abetting and conspiracy. Such information 
failures are quite common in legislatures, in large part because of what I call the 
"generality gap" between politics and law. Turn on C-SPAN and you will not see 
legislators reading statutes into the camera; they are reading speeches, speeches 
whose audience is the electorate, not the experts. During debate, the complexities 
of legislation are often lost, leaving details crucial to lawyers ignored. Such gaps 
are ameliorated, in the standard case, by the incentives of citizens and interest 
groups who oppose laws to offer conflicting views and information and make them 
felt in pre-debate committee venues. But in a world where there is really no 
opposition, there is little incentive for anyone to raise the problem that the 
kingpin who is legislated against will turn out to be the courier. 
Perhaps more importantly, scholars may want to consider even deeper 
institutional reforms: one way to fight institutional malfunction in government is 
to harness the incentives of a competing institution. Ever since John Ely wrote 
decades ago, it has become conventional constitutional wisdom that political 
malfunction is a reason to consider stronger judicial intervention in the legislative 
arena.
62 Why not in the substantive criminal law? After all, the state is depriving 
citizens of their liberty. If harms to minorities deserve heightened judicial 
scrutiny, why not the claims of people who, if they are convicted, cannot vote and 
60. I offer this hypothesis in deliberately conclusory fashion with the hope that it will in fact be 
taken as it is offered, as a hypothesis, while I complete the much larger study which is underway. 
61. I do not mean to slight here various cultural explanations; it also seems true to me that the 
decline of religion, and an institutionalized ideal of mercy, are factors of at least equal importance to 
structural changes. Those structural changes, it seems to me, are likely to exacerbate such a cultural 
shift. 
62. John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 135 (Harv. U. Press 1980). 
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are termed "civilly dead"? One need not transform every criminal case into a 
constitutional case; one might simply, as William Stuntz argues, use statutory 
interpretation as a lever in this battle.63 In constitutional law, courts and 
commentators have become quite accustomed to super-clear statement rules64 and 
have felt themselves quite free to assert their power in the case of repeated 
political malfunction and structural concern. Why not consider such intervention 
to refuse to apply irrational penalty structures (ones that could only be passed into 
law in a world where there was no one to point up the obvious problems)? Even if 
such a rule would not prevent excess, it might aid in political transparency, 
increased saliency, and might even reduce the political costs of opposing such 
legislation. 
Whatever the merit of these proposals, it does seem to me to be time to 
begin anew in the criminal law. History demands as much from those of us who 
have the privilege to write and teach these matters. We have spent almost an 
entire century looking for the "causes" for crime that have never been uncovered 
to everyone's satisfaction;65 we have spent almost an entire century believing that 
the "science" of real numbers and facts will constrain legislatures when it has not; 
we have spent almost an entire century theorizing about retribution and 
deterrence and punishment only to discover what we should have known-that 
these ideas partake of the dangers of "semantic ascent" (they are full of normative 
contradiction because they are described at such a high level of abstraction).66 
Perhaps we might want to consider criminal laws from a different angle. But this 
can only occur if we, like Fletcher, look beyond the standard boundaries of the 
discipline, take risks, and "rethink" our assumptions about the criminal law. 
63. Stuntz, supra n. 4. 
64. One might call this "super-lenity," on the theory that the rule of lenity requires courts to 
construe statutes in favor of defendants. Clear statement rules, however, do not typically focus on all 
statutory matters (as does the rule of lenity) but rather on particular questions that reflect 
constitutional anxieties, particularly structural anxieties. In this case, the argument would be that the 
kind of penalty structures created shift powers from the judiciary to prosecutors, increasing the relative 
risk to individuals or what I have called minoritarian risk. 
65. It may well be that we will only find the causes of crime when we find the "causes" of emotion. 
See James Gilligan, Violence 45-55 (Vintage Bks. 1997). 
66. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 843 (2001) (arguing that "retributivism fails to satisfy its own criteria of just punishment"); 
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413 (1999) (suggesting that 
deterrence is a political idiom reflecting radically-conflicting social and cultural meanings); Nourse, 
supra n. 14 (suggesting that retributivism and deterrence have conflicting meanings as both limits and 
permissions and thus are unhelpful in rejecting or accepting any particular doctrine). 
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APPENDIX A 
1. 1927 Cal. Sess. Laws ch. 634, 1066, (amending 1923 Cal. Sess. Laws ch. 
111, 237); Cal. Penal Code § 644 (1931) (mandatory life sentence after third 
specified felony conviction). 
2. 1929 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 85, § 3, 310; Colo. Stat. Ann. § 553, 1164-65 
(1935) (mandatory life sentence after third specified felony conviction). 
3. 1927 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws§ 7107 (1929); Fla. Stat. Ann, § 775.10 (West 
1944) (mandatory life sentence after third felony or attempted felony 
conviction). 
4. 1923 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 109, § 1, 139; Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2414 
(1932) (discretionary life sentence upon third felony conviction). 
5. 1927 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 191, § 1, 247; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21-107a 
(1935) (mandatory life sentence after second felony conviction). 
6. 1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 24, § 12, 53, amending 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 175, § 
12, 325; Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.12 (1948) (mandatory life sentence after 
third specified felony conviction). 
7. 1927 Minn. Sess. Laws ch. 236, § 2, 338; Minn Stat. § 610.29(1) (1941) 
(mandatory life sentence if the fourth felony may be punishable by life 
sentence). 
8. 1927 N.J. Sess. Laws ch. 263, 483; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2:103-10 (1937) 
(discretionary life sentence after third conviction). 
9. 1929 N.M. Sess. Laws ch. 58, § 3, 83; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-1603 (1941) 
(mandatory life sentence after third felony conviction). 
10. 1926 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 457, § 2, 805 (mandatory life sentence after 
third felony conviction). 
11. 1927 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 126, § 2, 158; N.D. Rev. Code§ 12-0621 (1943) 
(discretionary life sentence after third felony conviction). 
12. 1929 Ohio Sess. Laws H.R. 8, § 2, 40; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 13744-2 
(Anderson 1939) (mandatory life sentence after third specified felony). 
13. 1927 Or. Sess. Laws ch. 334, § 3, 432; Or. Code Ann. § 13-2803 (1930) 
(mandatory life sentence after third felony conviction). 
14. 1929 Pa. Sess. Laws 373, § 2, 854; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 922 (West 
1936) (discretionary life sentence after third specified felony). 
15. 1927 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 119, § 2, 143; S.D. Comp. Laws § 3613 (1929) 
(discretionary life sentence after third felony conviction). 
16. 1939 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 22, § 2, 106-107; 7 Williams Tenn. Code Ann.§ 
11863.2 (Supp. 1952) (mandatory life sentence after third specified felony). 
2004] RETHINKING CRIME LEGISLATION 
17. 1927 Vt. Sess. Laws 128, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, § 8616 (1947) (mandatory 
life sentence after third conviction). 
18. 1939 W. Va. Acts ch. 26, art. 11, § 19; W. Va. Code § 6130 (1943) 
(mandatory life sentence after second conviction). 
19. 1937 Wyo. Laws ch. 68, § 2, 103; Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-110 (1945) 
(mandatory life sentence after third conviction). 
939 
The following 6 states had laws mandating life after 4 or fewer convictions in 
force from 1920 until 1940 but these laws were likely to have been enacted at an 
earlier date: 
20. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 63 (1925) (mandatory life sentence upon 
third felony conviction). 
21. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2339 (1926); 1907 Ind. Sess. Laws, ch. 82, § 1, 109 
(mandatory life sentence after second felony conviction). 
22. Carroll's Ky. Stat. Ann. § 1130 (1930) (mandatory life sentence upon 
third felony conviction); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.190 (1942). 
23. Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 11594 (1921) (mandatory life sentence upon 
second conviction if the subsequent offense is punishable by a life 
sentence). 
24. OK. Stat. art. 6, § 1818 (1931) (mandatory life sentence upon second 
felony conviction if the subsequent offense is punishable by a life sentence). 
25. Wash. Rev. Stat. § 2286 (1932) (mandatory life after second felony or 
fourth specified lesser crime). 
This is not a complete list of all relevant state statutes as this research 
remains in progress; it should be noted that other states during this period, and 
earlier, had habitual offender statutes, with penalties less than life sentences. 
